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A political-representational crisis: A response to the draft manifesto for a 
social materialist psychology of distress 
 
Jan Burns, Professor of Clinical Psychology, Department of Applied Psychology, 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
 
At a broad brush level I could go along with this manifesto. Largely positioning myself as a 
social constructionist, feminist, critical psychologist in terms of leanings, with a healthy 
respect for evidence based practice, such a manifesto at first sight appealed, and so I 
happily agreed to provide a response. However, as with many things the devil is in the detail 
and when I sat at my computer giving it a couple of close reads, poised as I had first thought 
to write an entirely supportive response, I started to feel less comfortable, and indeed I found 
myself actually marshalling more of a critical set of thoughts than anticipated. Here’s why: 
1. I have grown suspicious of binary polemics and in this manifesto I see too many of them. 
CBT, cognitive psychology, proximal, intrapersonal = bad; systemic, community 
psychology, distal and interpersonal = good. Surely we have all moved on from this and 
have a much more sophisticated understanding of the world and psychology’s place in it 
than this? I will not go into the details that I am sure will be presented in other responses 
from my more model fidelity conscious colleagues, but I suggest that few psychological 
practitioners these days would really truly advocate models of psychotherapeutic 
practice which are completely removed from the material world. Sure, the biological 
reductionist debate still rages in psychiatry, but in the mainstream practice of applied 
psychology I see psychologists highly aware of social inequality and striving very hard to 
take account of this in theory, research and practice. Undoubtedly, such pluralism is 
being ever more tightly constrained and boxed in through the increasingly restrictive re-
construction (or destruction) of our health system, but this is a consequence of politics 
and economics not driven by our psychological understandings, which in my view are far 
more diverse and sophisticated than suggested here. The status against which we need 
to react is I feel overly caricatured, making me want to redress the balance a little.   
2. So who are these mystery psychologists ignoring social and material influences, taking a 
mechanistic approach and through re-engineering cognitive or neurological processes 
believe they can cure the internal defect which has resulted in distress? The strident CB 
therapist eschewing all but internally generated maladjusted schemas has taken on the 
stature of a tyrannical despot, but it is one I just do not recognise in the people around 
me. Maybe I just don’t get out enough, but most of the psychologists I know expend a 
fair amount of intellectual energy trying to integrate their understanding of psychology 
with the world at large in which they practice, teach or research. Indeed, this is not 
through just individual preference but through the professional structures we have in 
place to support this. The QAA benchmarks, HCPC Standards of Proficiency and 
Standards of Education and Training require an understanding of psychological 
knowledge within the context of history and philosophies of knowledge and research to 
be attained by every qualifying psychologist. Indeed, my experience of the last 20 years 
of working with clinical psychology trainees is that an understanding of psychological 
distress within a wider social, political and economic context is very warmly greeted. 
Who are these psychologists towards whom the manifesto points an accusatory finger?  
Clearly the authors of the manifesto are quite rightly trying to move on from psychology 
criticising psychiatry and vice versa, but constructing an alternative good/bad dichotomy 
in psychology which may have little resonance with reality should be questioned.  
3. Perhaps also as a consequence of wanting to move away from the 
psychology/psychiatry dialectic I also found myself wanting to remind us of two very 
basic tools within clinical/therapeutic psychology, the first being formulation. The points 
in the paper about the dangers of diagnosis are well made, but also well rehearsed. 
Psychologists are taught to formulate and it is here where we have to integrate our 
understanding of the internal and external world in terms of psychological explanation. 
This is a unique skill to psychology and one we should be promoting heavily. The words 
formulation or formulate do not appear once in the document. Given, for me, the 
manifesto is light on the ‘what should we do’, whilst heavy on the ‘what we should not do’ 
this is an important omission.  
The second tool I wanted to remind us about is the simple model of antecedents, 
behaviours, and consequences, our ABCs. Whilst originating from a behaviourist school, 
this simple conceptualisation has much wider applicability, especially when 
conceptualised systemically, not as a singular causal pathway and phenomenologically 
to include personal experience, not just observable behaviour. It draws our attention to 
definitions, which are sadly missing from the manifesto, with neither distress nor social 
materialist psychology being defined, (the latter being an especially significant omission 
as this is what is being espoused as an alternative viewpoint). Taking a dynamic ABC 
perspective of psychological distress makes us define the observable and 
phenomenological characteristics of this state of distress (e.g. demoralization and 
pessimism towards the future, anguish and stress, self depreciation, social withdrawal 
and isolation, somatization, and withdrawal unto oneself, according to Massè, 2000). 
Noticing along the way that these features are shared by numerous labels (ADHD, 
schizophrenia, anorexia etc.) i.e. are not discrete categories, and that they all fall on 
dynamic, relational continuums, not a binary cliff. In other words, they can only be 
considered unusual, and therefore perhaps worthy of treatment if they occur at a 
significant level of intensity and, or, for an unusually protracted period of time, to be of 
course defined usually statistically, and that such experiential phenomena are open to be 
measured reliably. Whilst simultaneously recognising that these are arbitrary judgements 
of ab/normality heavily open to historical and cultural influence.  Trying to understand the 
antecedents to such phenomena requires us to survey the landscape from the proximal 
to the distal, from the biological to the economic, allowing us to hold wide ranging 
associated factors and multiple, interacting contributing antecedents simultaneously. 
Likewise understanding the consequences of such life contexts and experiences from 
this perspective requires us to take a broader, holistic, perspective, considering not just 
the internal psychological sequelae, but also the interpersonal and material, leading us 
clearly into the vicious spirals which then come into operation.   
 
Using such a framework it is impossible to conceptualise distress as a discrete category 
or diagnosis because it raises too many questions and relative propositions. Quite rightly 
the manifesto clearly states distress is not about categories or diagnoses, but makes this 
point largely through a critique of diagnosis without pointing, except in the briefest detail, 
to alternatives. Regardless of whether you have formulation written through you like a 
stick of rock, or find the ABC model of any value or not, what I crave for in this manifesto 
is a strong psychological framework being put forward as a way of explaining distress, 
not just a series of ‘what it is not’. What about grasping the opportunity and trying to 
explain what psychological distress is, what causes it and the appropriate responses? I 
wonder how easily we could come to an agreed alternative conceptualisation and if our 
fear of not being able to do this is what drives us into the less problematic, polarised, 
area of agreeing what it is not.  
 
4. ‘Distress cannot be removed by will power.....The notion of willpower inhabits many 
theories of psychotherapy’ – although having been taught a number of 
psychotherapeutic modalities I never thought distress could be overcome by will power, 
nor indeed do I recall having had many professional conversations suggesting this, over 
and above explaining how the ‘pull yourself together’ approach is less than helpful. I do 
however, believe in resilience, although in the manifesto this is described as the more 
‘fashionable’ idea, which came as a surprise to me as I remember reading ‘Vulnerability 
and Resilience in Human Development: A Festschrift for Ann and Alan Clark’ (Tizard, & 
Varma, 2000), which so clearly set out the evidence over three decades showing the 
potential of an individual to break the chain of disadvantage, and how multiple 
disadvantages, (what we would call today adverse inter-sectionality), make it harder. 
Psychological research has provided us with much insight into understanding how we 
can reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience. I find the message in the manifesto 
around these issues a little confused and again I feel a real lost opportunity to say what a 
more psychologically informed understanding gives us.  
 
5. I find it hard to talk about different paradigmatic approaches within psychology without 
also having a parallel discourse about what constitutes evidence, and so inevitably 
research paradigms. I find it odd that this manifesto says little about evidence. 
Thankfully, it keeps away from the quantitative/qualitative dialectic; however I find it 
equally as strange that whilst critiquing the quality of existing research it seems to hold 
up the traditional experimental/RCT approach as the gold standard with no comment. 
Approaches to how we research a topic go hand in hand with how we conceptualise the 
topic, and this can be no better demonstrated in the field of psychological distress than in 
Massè’s paper ‘Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses of Psychological Distress: 
methodological Complementarity and Ontological Incommensurability’ (2000).  
 
In this paper he sets out to explore distress using both qualitative and qualitative 
methods. The results set out two descriptions of distress, one resulting from the cultural 
forms through which the participants described their distress (qualitative constructs) and 
the other through factors derived from the statistical analysis of a quantitative measure of 
distress. The approach demonstrates the complementarity of the two methodological 
approaches, but reveals two operationalisations of the concept of psychological distress 
‘founded on incommensurable representations of distress’, one being the more 
phenomenological ‘lived language’ and the other the more reified empirical entity, but 
both having he suggests strong methodological and empirical legitimacy.  
 
This ontological incommensurability lies at the heart of the argument underlying this 
manifesto. Massè describes on the one hand the scientists’ search for certainty and 
order, in the this case by containment within the individual through the imposition of a 
limited nosology, compared to the ‘interpretative-constructivist’ position which he 
describes well by quoting from Abbot (1992) ‘fuzzy realities with autonomously de-fined 
complex properties...engaging in a perpetual dialogue with their environ-ment’ (as cited 
by Massè, 2000, p20). Massè (2000) also notes that both positions are influenced by the 
researcher themselves and are ‘scientific construals that try to integrate these empiricist 
and semiotic fragments of distress into coherent representations.’ p20.  
 
Massè’s paper draws to a conclusion by positing that we not only have two 
incommensurable representations of distress (and I would suggest we have more than 
two), but one is prefaced above the other through the existence of the ‘dominant, 
instrumentalist rationality in the man-agement of illness’ p20 i.e. the vehicles of politics 
and government. This he terms ‘a political-representational crisis’. This brings me to my 
final point, of how theoretical understanding and research evidence is processed through 
the vagaries of political direction, policy making and service delivery.  
 
6. There is a serious job to do in terms of the delivery of psychological understanding into  
political debates and decision making, which in turn result in policy and service delivery. 
Providing alternative explanations are as important as combating arguments. To these 
ends I would like to point at another previously published manifesto – The Geek 
Manifesto: Why science matters (Henderson, 2012). 
 
In this book is a chapter entitled ‘Policy –based evidence: why science matters to 
government’ in which Henderson gently explains that what politicians want is not 
evidence-based policy, but policy-based evidence, i.e. ‘spray-on evidence……The 
conclusion comes first, followed by a trawl of useful data that might be daubed on 
afterwards’, p48. He goes on to describe other types of evidence abuse and acts of wilful 
ignorance. Other chapters cover the media, education, the law, economics and health. 
Having presented some convincing evidence as to how the world of policy making and 
implementation works, and how divorced it is from scientific evidence, he presents a 
manifesto of how science should be used to influence policy, and then goes one step 
further by reminding us that we all have a responsibility to play a part in this. This is a 
helpful reminder as it drops this responsibility straight back into my lap and that of all 
other psychologists who by deem of their privileged professional training have a 
responsibility to try and explain psychological distress.  
 
So to summarise, whilst I may seem somewhat critical in my reflections on this manifesto, it 
is meant constructively and to add liveliness to this debate, as I must congratulate the 
authors most sincerely because they have had the courage, energy and foresight to write 
this and get the ball rolling. The dilemma we find at the heart of this discussion about 
distress is not a new one and suffers so clearly from the ‘politico-representational crisis’ 
described by Massè. We need to find a way though this, firstly by greater reflexivity and 
understanding the forces which may drive us to unhelpful binary polemics. This should be in 
addition to combating what we believe are unhelpful beliefs,  but perhaps just as importantly 
forcefully foreground what we do believe as psychologists about the roots of distress, the 
function it plays in our society and how to alleviate it. Of course easier to suggest than do, 
but let the debate continue and flourish and let us at least, as this manifesto is I believe 
trying to do, get some broad brush strokes of understanding painted on the ground.  
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